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School of Social Work
Community organizers in the United States have two tasks to-
day: a short-term defensive one of holding back the rightward
assault against both the social welfare state and the working
class in general; and a long-term, mobilizing task of building a
constituency strong enough to transform the welfare state itself.
We cannot lose sight of this latter goal, for the method and ob-
jectives we set for ourselves in the short-run will greatly deter-
mine the feasibility of our long-term goals.
This is no small matter, for the assault on the welfare state
is as fundamental to the restructuring of class and social rela-
tions today as the New Deal was in helping to stabilize and expand
social wages for working people in the 1930s . Today, economists
as varied as Silk, Gordon, Bluestone and Thurow see our society
moving toward a highly stratified, two-tiered class system of very
well-off professional workers and managers and a huge layer of far
poorer, underskilled workers kept passive by their fears of join-
ing the so-called underclass. 1  Homelessness and gentrification;
the birth of yuppies and the emergence of the underclass; the rise
of privatization and the decline of entitlements are all part of
this new stratification. In this context, the roles of social
workers, with the exception of those entering private practice,
can only become increasingly marginal, less skilled, and less au-
tonomous if this crisis is not altered politically.
2
This daunting economic and social reality must inform any
strategy for social change that we attempt. We, therefore, must,
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confront the issues of power -- power now being utilized to de-
stroy the lives of hundred of thousands of people through dein-
dustrialization, gentrification, Social Darwinism -- if we are to
re-emerge with our own power to combat the right. If we use the
wrong tactics and create false illusions that eventually undermine
long-term effectiveness, we can never attain those long-term
goals.
This is why today's emphasis on electoralism, especially Dem-
ocratic Party electoralism, is such a misguided tactic. A brief
look at history shows no example of movement activity increasing
its strength once it entered the Democratic Party. Let me cite
two examples: the major gains of the welfare state and the labor
movement occurred before labor's and left's entry into FDR's 1936
coalition; indeed, the movement quickly suffered defeats culminat-
ing in the debacle of Little Steel in 1937.3 Likewise, the major
growth of civil rights organizations occurred before their entan-
glements with Democratic Party electoralism after 1964. 4
The dissipation of movement activity occurred when the move-
ments themselves were quite powerf,,l. Such power gave a spurious
but understandable rationale to entry into the Democratic Party.
Today, no such movements exist. Thus, the possibility of resist-
ing such cooptive tactics is even less likely. The Rainbow Coali-
tion learned this when the Black Caucus' designate for Vice-Chair
was for the first time ever denied selection. Since then, Kennedy
and other progressives have admittedly moved o the right. So
much for the possibilities of "internal reform.
''
Electoralism itself, given strong movement support and in-
dependence, is viable. But the ideas expressed in campaigns must
be sufficiently visible, even in nascent form, to connect politi-
cal, economic, and social issues in some meaningful way. That
simply does not exist today.
Indeed, this is true even for the Rainbow Coalition. The
Rainbow Coalition, while having the outlines of the social com-
position we all wish, has shown itself to have limited staying
power since the election. (As the Black Caucus incident above
suggests.) The one exception is Chicago, where the virulent, en-
trenched racism of the white community has kept alive a defensive
unity within the Black Community.
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The Rainbow Coalition has had little staying power because
its leadership has no interest in maintaining a highly mobilized,
increasingly skilled and active constituency in their own trade
unions, civil rights organizations, and professional groups. To
do that would be to join short-term objectives with the long-term
ideas and consciousness that train people in their own self-
determination. Such a phrase is no longer heard in organizing
circles -- self-determination would contest for power within our
own organization before it threatened the right. Instead, today's
emphasis is on what is popularly called "empowerment" but what, in
fact, is nationalist pluralism.
Nationalist pluralism is a two-headed phenomenon --
nationalist, in the progressive, populist sense of fighting for a
particular people's civil rights, anti-police brutality, pro-
affirmative action, for example. It is highly conservative,
however, in the pluralist sense of "empowering" only a particular
stratum of its population to maintain the status quo, ignoring the
changing economic relationships developing beneath them.
Pluralism is concerned only with political elites and consciously
ignores the disparity in economic arrangements within groupings.
This is why it is possible for there to be a ten-fold increase in
Black and Hispanic officials and a five-fold increase in female
lawmakers since 1970 concurrent to the emergence of the so-called
underclass and the "feminization of poverty."
Thus, even the Rainbow Coalition ignored the ways to join
economic and political issues by working in their own organiza-
tions to change them. Many rallies would be held with thousands
of people, but they were there only to listen; there were massive
campaigns, but no mass participation. (For example, Jackson
staffers took over every local headquarters and arbitrarily vetoed
any fund-raiser that could not bring in $3,000.) The remaining
engagement of more and more people in economic and political is-
sues that affect their lives daily just has not happened.
For this engagement must be more than simple "participation"
at scattered events. It needs to involve a process that educates
and socializes people to feel more confident about themselves and
their ability to act on their world. Organizing is designed to
carry out this process, even when movements are weak. Elec-
toralism, especially when there are few developed community and
mass-based organizations influencing it, runs counter to that
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development process. Even local campaigns emphasize a narrow
range of techniques: high status, given to officials and es-
tablished leaders, especially those running for office; highly
specific issues confined to dominant perceptions of problems that
reinforce mainstream, status quo changes; and a task-oriented,
"there's no time for talk!" method of functioning that limits
political education and training immensely. Only the glow -- and
I admit it is real at first -- of fighting on the side of progres-
sivism against the forces of reaction creates anything sustaining
for the membership. But that glow cannot and does not last, even
with local-level victories, if the material conditions affecting
daily life are not altered and if the likelihood of long-term so-
cial justice is not improved upon. More often than not, when
those conditions do not change, that glow of idealism is replaced
by the greyer passivity of fatalism.
It is the lack of connection between our short-term struggles
and our long-term goals that contributes so much to our weakness
at mobilization. Reagan, on the other hand, has no such problem
at present. He calls for a "new, vigorous free enterprise," and
concrete images of Silicon Valley and rich yuppies come into view
that give hope, however illusory, to the right wing rhetoric.
Likewise, his attacks against a bloated welfare state bureaucracy
have equally clear, dismal images of indifferent employment coun-
selors and hostile welfare workers which, however misunderstood,
legitimate his claim for further cuts. Conservative electoralism
and mobilization of the right move in easy symmetry, feeding off
each other's strengths to continue economic restratification,
militarism, and racist and sexist Social Darwinism.
We have no such symmetry. We need to defend entitlements,
but there can be no illusions about how they are dispensed: the
welfare state has too much bloated bureaucracy. Trade unionism,
historically and symbolically a representation of working class
independence and strength, needs to be maintained, but anyone who
has worked in trade union activity knows they bear little
resemblance to democratic, internally heterogeneous organizations.
They need to be redemocratized and restructured if they are to be
able again to fight for better working conditions and improving
standards of living. All of this is true to civil rights or-
ganizations as well.
In short, the crisis of progressive politics today, be it
European social democracy, Third World socialism or United States
liberalism, has developed in large part because of the discrepancy
between our ideas and the concrete models we have used to rep-
resent those ideas. In great measure, we have nothing to excite
people to build towards a better world. While defensive mobiliza-
tions, especially against racism and sexism, are possible, such
fights historically have little staying power if they are not con-
nected to concrete formations like the CI0 in the 1930s or SNCC in
the early 196 0s. This is why, despite the efforts of thousands of
people in 1984, the power of the right is greater than ever today.
As painful as it is to face, two-party electoralism in this
historical period must be viewed as counter-productive. It di-
verts people from the rebuilding and redemocratizing of our or-
ganizations that can then begin exciting others to consider
widespread, lasting mobilization. Only such movement activity has
the staying power, ideas and creativity to threaten the new power-
ful right wing.
In the mid-1980s, therefore, our social welfare strategies,
while in the short-run defensive in character, need to concentrate
in five arenas:
(a) legislative coalitions fighting for entitlements
(b) anti-gentrification coalitions (i.e., homelessness,
tenants' rights, etc.)
(c) rank and file trade unionism
(d) anti-racist and anti-sexist groups
(e) anti-intervention, anti-militarism coalitions
The first type of coalition fights for maintenance of the
social wage. It does not demand sectarian perfection; such coali-
tions will include politicians and others not interested in long-
term, wide-scale reform but who are short-term allies who can be
pushed to fight for social welfare. The next two arenas will be
more grassroots-based and, thus, capable of widespread internal
education and activity. For example, anti-gentrification efforts
often bring professionals and community people together where
there are possibilities of breaking down status illusions regard-
ing leadership and types of expertise. Rank and file trade
unionism, while fighting for specific needs of union members, also
carries the possibility of reforming unions in the process by em-
phasizing greater democratic traditions. Anti-sexist and anti-
racist groups (such as pro-abortion groups and anti-police
brutality coalitions) defend people under attach from the Social
Darwinism of right-to-lifers, anti-humanists, the Klan, etc. The
final, anti-intervention coalition, while not specific to social
welfare, serves the important educational purpose of fighting
ideas that spread militarism and economic investment in the war
machine. Such ideas need to be countered if investment in social
needs is ever to increase again.
Such coalitions are not that different from much work now
being suggested by others. But they must also join these strug-
gles with the long-term goals discussed at the start of this paper
still in mind. That means:
(a) Podlitical objectives must have short-term and long-term
goals beneath them so political education moving in the
direction of self-determination is possible. If large
numbers of new people are not developed with both
self-confidence and political awareness there is little
likelihood for sustained progressive activity.
(b) Coalition work, the training of activists, etc., must,
therefore, always attempt to include clients, students,
the unemployed, etc. whenever possible to break down
elitism in our own ranks.
(c) Feminist process must be used as much as possible so
that we all relearn new ways to behave while working
together.
Through this process new, more collective and supportive
forms of leadership can be developed. In this way the vision of a
better world and the way we shall try to work in that world take
on concrete form in the present.
This work will be small-scale now: in rank and file cau-
cuses; as parts of coalitions, often in minority positions; in
work that has neither immediate victories nor illusions. It will
seem paltry, a "joke" compared to the power of the right. But
let's not forget that in 1964 the right wing was seen as a joke.
Yet they did the same kind of small-scale work, building to a
point where twenty years later we are no longer laughing.
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